Abstract: This talk is a comparison of how different approaches to hyperintensionality, aboutness and subject matter treat (classically) logically equivalent statements. I compare and contrast two different notions of subject matter that might be thought to be representational or truth first – Aboutness (Princeton University Press, 2014), and truthmakers conceived of as situations, as discussed in my “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity.” I contrast this with the kind of inferentialist account of hyperintensionality arising out of the proof invariants I have explored in recent work.
This is a talk presented at the Glasgow-Melbourne Formal Philosophy Workshop.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.