Proof Identity, Aboutness and Meaning

November 11, 2017

Abstract: This talk is a comparison of how different approaches to hyperintensionality, aboutness and subject matter treat (classically) logically equivalent statements. I compare and contrast two different notions of subject matter that might be thought to be representational or truth first – Aboutness (Princeton University Press, 2014), and truthmakers conceived of as situations, as discussed in my “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity.” I contrast this with the kind of inferentialist account of hyperintensionality arising out of the proof invariants I have explored in recent work.

This is a talk presented at the Glasgow-Melbourne Formal Philosophy Workshop.


about

I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.

subscribe

To receive updates from this site, subscribe to the RSS feed in your feed reader. Alternatively, follow me at  @consequently@hcommons.social, where most updates are posted.

contact

This site is powered by Netlify, GitHub, Hugo, Bootstrap, and coffee.   ¶   © 1992– Greg Restall.