“Realistic Belief Revision,” with John Slaney, Proceedings of the First World Congress in the Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence (Paris, July 1995), 367–378.

 download pdf

In this paper we consider the implications for belief revision of weakening the logic under which belief sets are taken to be closed. A widely held view is that the usual belief revision functions are highly classical, especially in being driven by consistency. We show that, on the contrary, the standard representation theorems still hold for paraconsistent belief revision. Then we give conditions under which consistency is preserved by revisions, and we show that this modelling allows for the gradual revision of inconsistency.

Do you like this, or do you have a comment? Then please  share or reply on Twitter, or  email me.

← Arithmetic and Truth in Łukasiewicz's Infinitely Valued Logic | Writing Archive | Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity →


I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.



To receive updates from this site, you can subscribe to the  RSS feed of all updates to the site in an RSS feed reader, or follow me on Twitter at  @consequently, where I’ll update you if anything is posted.