Realistic Belief Revision

October 1995

“Realistic Belief Revision,” with John Slaney, Proceedings of the First World Congress in the Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence (Paris, July 1995), 367–378.

In this paper we consider the implications for belief revision of weakening the logic under which belief sets are taken to be closed. A widely held view is that the usual belief revision functions are highly classical, especially in being driven by consistency. We show that, on the contrary, the standard representation theorems still hold for paraconsistent belief revision. Then we give conditions under which consistency is preserved by revisions, and we show that this modelling allows for the gradual revision of inconsistency.


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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.

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