PHIL40013: Uncertainty, Vagueness and Disagreement

March 2020

at the University of Melbourne

PHIL40013: Uncertainty, Vagueness and Disagreement is a University of Melbourne honours seminar subject for fourth-year students. Our aim in the Honours program is to introduce students to current work in research in philosophy of logic and language.

In 2020, we’re covering the connections between speech acts, epistemology and normative theory.

  1. Introduction and overview, background
  2. Speech acts: what are they?
    • J. L. Austin, How to Do things with Words, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. [Read Lecture 9]
    • H. P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” pages 41–58 in Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts, edited by P. Cole and J. L. Morgan, Academic Press, New York, 1975.
    • Sarah E. Murray and William B. Starr, “Force and Conversational States,” pages 202–236 in New Work on Speech Acts, edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris and Matthew Moss, Oxford University Press, 2018. [Read Sections 9.1 and 9.2]
    • Nuel Belnap “Declaratives are not Enough”, Philosophical Studies 59:1 (1990) 1–30.
    • Mark Lance and Rebecca Kukla “Leave the Gun; Take the Cannoli! The Pragmatic Topography of Second-Person CallsEthics 123:3 (2013) 456–478.
    • Mark Lance and Rebecca Kukla Yo! and Lo! The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons, Harvard University Press, 2009. [Read Chapter 1]
    • Craige Roberts “Speech Acts in Discourse Context”, pages 317–359 in New Work on Speech Acts, edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris and Matthew Moss, Oxford University Press, 2018.
  3. Assertion
    • John Macfarlane, “What is Assertion?” pages 79–96 in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen, Oxford University Press, 2011.
    • Ishani Maitra, “Assertion, Norms, and Games” pages 277–296 in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen, Oxford University Press, 2011.
    • Jennifer Lackey, “Norms of Assertion,” Noûs 41:4 (2007) 594–626.
    • Rachel Mckinnon, The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant, Palgrave, 2015.
    • Peter Pagin, “Assertion”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015.
  4. Common Ground and Accommodation
  5. Cooperation, Convention and Norms
  6. Stereotypes and Generics
  7. Authority and Epistemic Territory
  8. Illocutionary Silencing
  9. Gaslighting

For further information, contact me. To participate, check the handbook.


about

I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.

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