“Existence and Definedness: the semantics of possibility and necessity,” article in progress.
You are welcome to download and read this document. I especially welcome feedback on it. As it is not yet published in final form, if you want to cite the paper, please check with me first. Thanks.
In this paper, I will address just some of Professor Williamson’s treatment of necessitism in his Modal Logic as Metaphysics. I will give an account of what space might remain for a principled and logically disciplined contingentism. I agree with Williamson that those interested in the metaphysics of modality would do well to take quantified modal logic—and its semantics—seriously in order to be clear, systematic and precise concerning the commitments we undertake in adopting an account of modality and ontology. Where we differ is in how we present the semantics of that modal logic. I will illustrate how proof theory may play a distinctive role in elaborating a quantified modal logic, and in the development of theories of meaning, and in the metaphysics of modality.
The paper was first written for presentation in a workshop on Tim Williamson’s work, at the Asian Workshop in Philosophical Logic and the Taiwan Philosophical Logic Colloquium at the National Taiwan University. The slides from that talk are available here.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.