“Modelling Truthmaking,” Logique et Analyse, 169–170 (2000), 211–230 (published in 2003).

 download pdf

Published in a special issue of Logique et Analyse, on Truthmakers, edited by Peter Forrest and Drew Khlentzos. This expands on my paper “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity” by showing that the theses on truthmaking given in that paper are mutually consistent. It does this by providing a model in which each thesis is true. This model is an independently motivated model of a weak quantified relevant logic with an existence predicate.


Do you like this, or do you have a comment? Then please  share or reply on Twitter, or  email me.


← Just what <em>is</em> Full-Blooded Platonism? | Writing Archive | Great Moments in Logic →

about

I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.

elsewhere

subscribe

To receive updates from this site, you can subscribe to the  RSS feed of all updates to the site in an RSS feed reader, or follow me on Twitter at  @consequently, where I’ll update you if anything is posted.

search