This is Greg Restall’s website, with news, writings, links, and bite sized updates. For background look below.

A Note on Naïve Set Theory in LP

“A Note on Naïve Set Theory in LP,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33 (1992) 422–432.

My first publication. It stems from work I did in my Honours year (1989) with Graham Priest, on paraconsistent logic. I explain a particularly simple yet powerful technique for constructing models of naïve set theory in the paraconsistent logic LP. This can be used to show the consistency of the theory, and to construct models invalidating some of the axioms of ZFC.

Details

Author: Greg Restall
Status: Published in 1992

Local file: nstlp.pdf (1MB)

BibTeX Record: nstlp.bib

Subjects: models non-classical logic paraconsistency paradox sets

About

I’m Greg Restall, and this is my website. I work in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Email: greg at consequently.org; Post: School of of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry, University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia.

Start at the home page—a summary of the site. The left column is news, archived on the news archive page. The central column contains recent items from the writing page, which lists my publications. These are also categorised by topic. You can follow my links at my account on delicious and occasional short snarky remarks at @consequently on twitter.

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This site is handcoded: I write text in Textmate, and Webby files things in the right place and uploads them to the server. This page was last modified on 2008-12-31 at 12:28AM.

Thought

Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one’s own ratiocination, and does not extend to that of other men.
— Charles S. Peirce The Fixation of Belief.