This is Greg Restall’s website, with news, writings, pictures, and links. For background see below.

Truth Values and Proof Theory

“Truth Values and Proof Theory,” to appear in Studia Logica.

In this paper I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, feature as an idealisation of more fundamental logical features arising out of the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.

Details

Author: Greg Restall
Status: Accepted

Local file: tvpt.pdf (288KB)

DOI: 10.1007/s11225-009-9197-y

Subjects: classical logic intuitionistic logic modal logic models non-classical logic proofs sequents sets truth

About

I’m Greg Restall, and this is my website. I work in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Email: greg at consequently.org; Post: School of of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry, University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia.

Start at the home page—a summary of the site. The left column is news, archived on the news archive page. The central column is for photos, archived on the occasional photos page. The right column contains recent items from the writing page, which lists my publications. These are also categorised by topic. You can follow my links at my account on delicious and occasional short snarky remarks at @consequently on twitter.

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Thought

Since we are in the main not sceptics, we might go on and frankly confess to each other the motives for our several faiths. I frankly confess mine – I cannot but think that at bottom they are of an aesthetic and not of a logical sort. — William James Essays in Radical Empiricism.