“Models for Liars in Bradwardine's Theory of Truth,” pages 135-147 in Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox edited by Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo and Emmanuel Genot, Springer, 2008.

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Stephen Read’s work on Bradwardine’s theory of truth is some of the most exciting work on truth and insolubilia in recent years. In this paper, I give models for Read’s formulation of Bradwardine’s theory of truth, and I examine the behaviour of liar sentences in those models. I conclude by examining Bradwardine’s argument to the effect that if something signifies itself to be untrue then it signifies itself to be true as well. We will see that there are models in which this conclusion fails. This should help us elucidate the hidden assumptions required to underpin Bradwardine’s argument, and to make explicit the content of Bradwardine’s theory of truth.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.



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