“Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity 2008,” an addendum to “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity,” pages 98–101 in Truth and Truth-making, edited by E. J. Lowe and A. Rami, Acumen, 2008.

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I update “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity” with a response to Stephen Read's wonderful Mind 2000 argument to the effect that I got the disjunction thesis wrong.

I think I didn't get it wrong, but figuring out why it's OK to hold that a truthmaker makes a disjunction true iff it makes a disjunct true is not as straightforward as I first thought. Pluralism about truthmaking makes an entrance.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.



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