October 4, 2021

Abstract: In this talk, I reflect on the role of worlds–possible worlds and impossible worlds—both in the semantics of various kinds of languages and logics, and in broader issues in metaphysics. I will argue that, given very modest assumptions concerning the role of worlds in semantics, that any defender of possible worlds in such a role should be equally comfortable with impossible worlds.

However, this argument for impossible worlds does not transfer straightforwardly to logically impossible worlds. So, in the second part of the talk I will consider what we might say, for (or against) properly logically impossible worlds.


I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.



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