Justification Requests, Inference and Definitions

January 28, 2022

Abstract: In this talk, I examine some of the interconnections between speech acts, such as assertion and denial, inference, justification requests, and the common ground. When we pay attention to the structure of norms governing polar (yes/no) questions, we can clarify the distinction between strong and weak denials, together with the parallel distinction between strong and weak assertion, and the way that these speech acts interact with the common ground. In addition, we can give a distinctive answer to Carroll’s puzzle concerning the force of the logical must, and a sense in which certain rules for logical concepts can indeed count as definitions.


I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.


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