Ways Things Can't Be

March 1998

“Ways Things Can't Be,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38 (1997) 583–596 (published in 1998).

I show that the believer in possible worlds can have impossible worlds for free, as classes of possible worlds. These do exactly the job of ways that things cannot be, and they model the simple paraconsistent logic LP. This motivates a semantics for paraconsistent logic that even a classical logician can love.

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You are welcome to download and read this paper. I welcome any feedback you'd like to share. Please check the final published version if you wish to cite it. Thanks.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology ¶ I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.

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