“Ways Things Can't Be,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38 (1997) 583–596 (published in 1998).
I show that the believer in possible worlds can have impossible worlds for free, as classes of possible worlds. These do exactly the job of ways that things cannot be, and they model the simple paraconsistent logic LP. This motivates a semantics for paraconsistent logic that even a classical logician can love.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ From August 2021, I will be the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.