JC Beall and Greg Restall “Logical Pluralism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78:4 (2000) 475–493


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This is our article on logical pluralism. We argue that the notion of logical consequence doesn’t pin down one deductive consequence relation, but rather, there are many of them. In particular, we argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations. We should not search for One True Logic, since there are Many.

A bigger version of the argument (with much more detail) is found in our book of the same name.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.



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