Modelling Truthmaking

July 2003

“Modelling Truthmaking,” Logique et Analyse, 169–170 (2000), 211–230 (published in 2003).

Published in a special issue of Logique et Analyse, on Truthmakers, edited by Peter Forrest and Drew Khlentzos. This expands on my paper “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity" by showing that the theses on truthmaking given in that paper are mutually consistent. It does this by providing a model in which each thesis is true. This model is an independently motivated model of a weak quantified relevant logic with an existence predicate.

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You are welcome to download and read this paper. I welcome any feedback you'd like to share. Please check the final published version if you wish to cite it. Thanks.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology ¶ I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.

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