“On Priest on Nonmonotonic and Inductive Logic,” Thought, 5:2 (2016) 119–124
Graham Priest defends the use of a nonmonotonic logic, LPm, in his analysis of reasoning in the face of true contradictions, such as those arising from the paradoxes of self-reference. In the course of defending the choice of this logic in the face of the criticism that LPm is not truth preserving, Priest argued that requirement is too much to ask: since LPm is a nonmonotonic logic, it necessarily fails to preserve truth. In this paper, I show that this assumption is incorrect, and I explain why nonmonotonic logics can nonetheless be truth preserving. Finally, I diagnose Priest’s error, to explain when nonmonotonic logics do indeed fail to preserve truth.
Graham Priest has written a very short reply to this article, which also appears in Thought.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ From August 2021, I will be the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.