“Paraconsistent Logics!,” Bulletin of the Section of Logic of the Polish Academy of Sciences 26 (1997) 156–163.
I respond to an interesting argument of Hartley Slater to the effect that there is no such thing as paraconsistent logic. Slater argues that since paraconsistent logics involve interpreting a sentence and its negation as both true at points in a model structure, it is not really negation that is being modelled, since negation is meant to be a contradictory forming operator. I sketch how different paraconsistentists can respond to his argument, and I then defend my own response, that although contradictions are indeed never true (and cannot be true) it does not follow that a semantics ought not evaluate them as true in certain models.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.