(with JC Beall) Logical Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2006.
This is our manifesto on logical pluralism. We argue that the notion of logical consequence doesn’t pin down one deductive consequence relation, but rather, there are many of them. In particular, we argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations. We should not search for One True Logic, since there are Many.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology ¶ I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.
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