(with Marta Bílková, Ondrej Majer and Michal Peliš), “Relevant Agents,” pages 22–38, in Advances in Modal Logic, Volume 8, College Publications, 2010.

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Majer and Peliš have proposed a relevant logic for epistemic agents, providing a novel extension of the relevant logic R with a distinctive epistemic modality K, which is at the one and the same time factive (Kφ → φ is a theorem) and an existential normal modal operator (K(φ ∨ ψ) → (Kφ ∨ Kψ) is also a theorem). The intended interpretation is that Kφ holds (relative to a situation s) if there is a resource available at s, confirming φ. In this article we expand the class of models to the broader class of ‘general epistemic frames’. With this generalisation we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation for the logic of general relevant epistemic frames. We also show, that each of the modal axioms characterises some natural subclasses of general frames.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.



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