“Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity,” Australian Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1996) 331–340.

 download pdf

A truthmaker for a proposition p is an object such that necessarily, if it exists, then p is true. In this paper, I show that the truthmaker thesis (that every truth has a truthmaker) and the disjunction thesis (that a truthmaker for a disjunction must be a truthmaker for one of the disjuncts) are jointly incompatible with the view that the if in the truthmaking clause is a merely material conditional. I then defend the disjunction thesis, and go on to argue that a relevant conditional will serve well in place of the material conditional in defining what it is to be a truthmaker. Conversely, I argue that a semantics involving truthmakers could shed some light on the interpretation of relevant implication.

Do you like this, or do you have a comment? Then please  share or reply on Twitter, or  email me.

← Realistic Belief Revision | Writing Archive | Display Logic and Gaggle Theory →


I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.



To receive updates from this site, you can subscribe to the  RSS feed of all updates to the site in an RSS feed reader, or follow me on Twitter at  @consequently, where I’ll update you if anything is posted.