(with Jc Beall, Ross Brady, Michael Dunn, Allen Hazen, Edwin Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, David Ripley, John Slaney and Richard Sylvan) “On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality,” Journal of Philosophical Logic (2012) 41:3, pp. 595–612.


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One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley–Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.



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