Abstract: What does the semantically anti-realist revisionary programme of Michael Dummett have to do with contemporary work on proof assistants? What are mathematicians doing when they encode their proofs in these proof assistants, based on constructive type theory? What does all this have to do with the(?) norms of assertion? (And are these norms of assertion relative or absolute, anyway?) Can I explain all of this, coherently, to a general audience of philosophers in five minutes?
The answer to the last of these questions is almost certainly no, but I’m going to give it a red hot go.
This talk is a five-minute lightning presentation at the Winter All-Arché Research Day.
A (one page) handout is here.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology ¶ I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.
To receive updates from this site, subscribe to the RSS feed in your feed reader. Alternatively, follow me at @consequently@hcommons.social, where most updates are posted.