Deviant Logic and the Paradoxes of Self-Reference

March 1993

“Deviant Logic and the Paradoxes of Self-Reference,” Philosophical Studies, 70 (1993) 279–303.

I argue that the extant reasons for sticking to classical logic in the face of the paradoxes of self reference are not good reasons. The paradoxes are really difficult and we should use all of the weapons at our disposal.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.


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