(with Daniel Nolan and Caroline West) “Moral Fictionalism versus the rest,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83 (2005), 307–330.
In this paper we introduce a distinct meta-ethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the “moral phenomena” while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distiguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism many all of the virtues of quasi-realism but few of the vices.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I teach philosophy and logic as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. ¶ Start at the home page of this site—a compendium of recent additions around here—and go from there to learn more about who I am and what I do. ¶ This is my personal site on the web. Nothing here is in any way endorsed by the University of Melbourne.