(with Shawn Standefer and Rohan French) “Proofs and Models in Naive Property Theory: A Response to Hartry Field's “Properties, Propositions and Conditionals”,” Australasian Philosophical Review, 4:2 (2020), 162–177.


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In our response Field’s “Properties, Propositions and Conditionals”, we explore the methodology of Field’s program. We begin by contrasting it with a proof-theoretic approach and then commenting on some of the particular choices made in the development of Field’s theory. Then, we look at issues of property identity in connection with different notions of equivalence. We close with some comments relating our discussion to Field’s response to Restall’s “What are we to accept, and what are we to reject, when saving truth from paradox?”.

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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.



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