Proofs and Models in Naive Property Theory: A Response to Hartry Field's “Properties, Propositions and Conditionals”

April 2020

Shawn Standefer, Rohan French and Greg Restall, “Proofs and Models in Naive Property Theory: A Response to Hartry Field's “Properties, Propositions and Conditionals”,” Australasian Philosophical Review, 4:2 (2020), 162–177.

doi:10.1080/24740500.2021.1886690

In our response Field’s “Properties, Propositions and Conditionals”, we explore the methodology of Field’s program. We begin by contrasting it with a proof-theoretic approach and then commenting on some of the particular choices made in the development of Field’s theory. Then, we look at issues of property identity in connection with different notions of equivalence. We close with some comments relating our discussion to Field’s response to Restall’s “What are we to accept, and what are we to reject, when saving truth from paradox?”.


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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.

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