What can we Mean? On Practices, Norms and Pluralisms (to appear in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society)
Last century, Michael Dummett argued that the principles of intuitionistic logic are semantically neutral, and that classical logic involves a distinctive commitment to realism. The ensuing debate over realism and anti-realism and intuitionistic logic has now receded from view. The situation is reversed in mathematics: constructive reasoning has become more popular in the 21st century with the rise of proof assistants based on constructive type theory. In this paper, I revisit Dummett’s concerns in the light of these developments, arguing that both constructive and classical reasoning are recognisable and coherent assertoric and inferential practices.
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I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology ¶ I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.
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