py4601: Paradoxes is an honours Philosophy module at the University of St Andrews. It’s coordinated by my colleague, Patrick Greenough, and I’m teaching a small slice at the end on the liar paradox.
Here’s what we’re covering in the whole module: A paradox is a plausible argument for an absurd conclusion. Better still: a paradox is an apparently plausible argument, with apparently plausible premises, which leads to an apparently absurd conclusion using apparently valid reasoning. In this module, we are going to look at three groups of paradoxes (and the connections between them):
This module is a mixture of meta-philosophy (the philosophy of the nature of philosophical problems and the methods we can or should use to address these problems) plus first-order philosophy (what is the best solution to, e.g., the Sorites Paradox?).
Some Philosophical Questions to be addressed:
Some Meta-Philosophical Questions to be addressed:
The module lies at the intersection of meta-philosophy with the philosophy of language, logic, the philosophy of logic, metaphysics, epistemology.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my personal website. ¶ I am the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and the Director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology ¶ I like thinking about – and helping other people think about – logic and philosophy and the many different ways they can inform each other.